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A TALE OF TWO CASES: REFLECTIONS ON PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS
Stephen A. Newman'
I. INTRODUCTION
Narratives about family life, especially those about families in crisis,
make compelling reading. Even judicial opinions can command a reader's
full attention when they relate the dry bones of legal doctrine to the lives
of real people involved in difficult personal relationships. In contested
child custody cases, the legal system compels people to formally present
details of their personal lives to a stranger, who must judge and impose
crucial decisions on them. It is not surprising that judges do not relish the
task of deciding custody cases. The decision is an awesome one with
literally incalculable consequences for children. Yet, for all their
significance, child custody cases are subject to routine handling, and
frequently go unnoticed by the public and the legal community. There is,
to be sure, the occasional spectacular case - Baby M.,1 for example - but
the mass of custody controversies among the more than one million
annual divorces2 in the United States are processed without fanfare by our
trial courts. They generate few precedent-setting appeals, receive little
attention in the law reviews, and create little stir in the community.
Nevertheless, "the law" of custody resides in the ordinary case, where real
meaning is given to the vague standard of the child's "best interests,"3 and
where fateful decisions for parents and children are made. It is in the flow
of these routine cases that the law most concretely and indelibly touches
the lives of real people.
In this essay, I will consider the handling of two ordinary custody
cases, selected from recent decisions reported to the New York legal
community by the daily legal newspaper, The New York Law Journal. The
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. In re Baby M., 109 NJ. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
2. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNITED STATES 88 (1989) (information based on estimate made in 1987 which is the most
recent year reported).
3. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893
(1982) (standard to be applied in custody proceeding remains the "best interests of the child
when all applicable factors are considered").
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cases were decided by the same judge4 sitting in the Nassau County
branch of the state supreme court. They focus on the disputed custody of
three children, all girls.
In examining these opinions, I will try to explore the complex factors,
both personal and institutional, that come into play in the deciding of
custody cases. Important influences on decision making, often
unacknowledged, emanate from the judges themselves: their own
assumptions about families; their deeply felt family values; and their
personal and unique experiences of family life. Other influences stem
from the institutional structure: the relative isolation of the trial judge;
the dependency upon court-affiliated experts; the ever-present caseloads
and time constraints; the use of forensic evaluations; in camera child
interviews; and the possibility of appellate reversal. The two opinions
chosen help illuminate these matters in a concrete way, although much
of what is said here about the deciding judge can only be speculative. In
discussing the particular cases, I am relying only on the reported opinions;
I have no knowledge of the personal beliefs and private thoughts of the
judge.
One final word is necessary. My study of these two cases certainly
confirms that deciding the fate of children in court is a hazardous
undertaking. We ask judges to make decisions of primary importance
without specialized training or expertise and under adverse conditions
imposed by heavy caseloads and limited resources. The law itself offers
only the most general guidance, leaving trial judges substantially on their
own in making these arduous decisions. The criticisms and suggestions I
offer with regard to these two opinions are made in the context of respect
for the work of the judge who wrote them, and for the conscientious way
in which he has approached the overwhelming responsibilities of custody
decision making.
II. Green v. Green:5 IS THERE A FEMININE MYSTIQUE?
When the Greens divorced in 1984, custody of their two sons was
awarded to the father.6 The court ordered joint custody for the daughter,
Tara, who was to live with her father. After four years under this
arrangement, the mother decided to ask for sole custody of Tara, then age
eleven. She did not seek to disturb the custody arrangement for either of
her sons, then ages fifteen and twenty.
At some time during the four year period, Mrs. Green remarried and
moved from New York to Virginia. When she applied for a change in
4. Judge Winick presided over both cases.
5. N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1988, at 23, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. July 13, 1988).
6. Id.
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Tara's custody, Mrs. Green's new family consisted of herself, her new
husband, his two sons, ages twelve and twenty, and a two-year-old girl,
born to her and her new husband.7
The judge reviewed the governing legal principles, which provide, inter
alia, that custody modifications should be determined based upon the
child's best interests,8 that custody, where possible, should be established
on a long-term basis to afford stability and continuing nurturance to the
child,9 and that geographic moves by one parent that interfere with the
other parent's access to a child are disfavored by the courts.'0 A shift in
custody to the mother in Virginia would, of course, significantly curtail
the father's access to his daughter.
To decide the case, the judge considered testimony at the hearing, an
in camera interview with Tara, and a forensic report made by the county
probation department." The judge did not consider the prior forensic
report made on the family by the department. He noted that "prior
studies made by the [d]epartment .. .[had] not been considered since
there was no agreement by the parties that the court could do so."12
The judge's opinion makes scant mention of the probation
department's current report, except to acknowledge the fact that one was
prepared, and that it, along with all of the other evidence in the case,
supported the judge's conclusion that custody of Tara should be
switched. 13 It is impossible to know whether the judge strongly relied upon
the statements in this report and whether the department's findings and
recommendations were based upon adequate investigation. In custody
cases, these non-partisan - though not necessarily adequate'4 - reports may
play an important role in the courts' decisions. It would seem to be good
practice to have judges indicate the nature of the report's contents and
the bases for their conclusions. Even if the report plays no role in a
judge's decision, this fact should be known to the probation department,
since it indicates a possible lack of confidence in the department's work.
7. Id.
8. See Friederwitzer v. Friedetwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893
(1982).
9. Id.
10. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170,418 N.E.2d 377,436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981); Strahl
v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1979), aff'a 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479,
429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980).
11. Green, N.Y.L.J. at 23, col. 6.
12. Id. at 23, col. 5. For discussion and criticism of this omission, see injra note 40 and
accompanying text.
13. Green, N.Y.L.J. at 23, col. 6.
14. For an excellent discussion, with numerous examples of deficiencies in these
reports, see Levy, Custody Investigations as Evidence in Divorce Cases, 21 FAss. L.Q. 149
(1987).
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Whether or not the judge was influenced by the probation report in
Green, he certainly seemed to be influenced by the in camera interview
with Tara. After noting that the court "is not bound by her desires, but
they are of interest,"'' the judge wrote:
Tara is about to become a teenager. She is eleven years old
but large for her age, being 5'4" tall and weighing about 130
pounds. She is far more advanced physically than the usual eleven
year old. The in camera interview gave a startling impression of
a person more mature than her age, also presenting an
unequivocal view of what she wants and needs.
In no uncertain terms and unhesitatingly she wants to live in
Virginia with her mother, and the reasons recited are mature,
understandable and consistent with her needs as a maturing
female teenager. These needs cannot be satisfied under the
present custodial arrangement wherein the household consists of
the father, a twenty-year-old brother and a fifteen-year-old
brother.16
It is at this point that the judge introduced the principal theme of
his opinion. Tara, we are told, is about to embark upon the "critical"
years, when she will pass from childhood to womanhood. 7 As a "maturing
female teenager," she will have needs that cannot be met in the home of
her father and two brothers, for this is a home that, in the judge's words,
is "male dominated."18 He wondered what would happen to Tara in this
presumably inhospitable environment:
Who does she talk to about her feminine needs? Her
brothers have no interest nor should they. Her father is loving,
but what he provided the last four years is simply inadequate for
the future. Except for his love and concern, and monetary
support, he cannot begin to offer to his daughter what she will
now need to maturity ....
She is right to feel that her mother is the more nurturing
parent. There are so many things that require a female presence
in the home. 9
15. Green, N.Y.L3. at 23, col. 6; see Levy, Father Custody, in CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND
TH LAw 100-13 (I). Schetky & E. Benedek eds. 1985).
16. Green, N.Y.LJ. at 23, col. 6 (italics supplied).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 24, col. 2.
19. Id. at 24, col. 1.
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The judge conceded that "under some circumstances [not specified]
a father [can] provide guidance to a female child," but that
[i]t would be detrimental to her future development for Tara to
reside in a home so dominated by males, without a mature female
presence. . . What advice will she receive from her father or
brothers? What can she ask them that they are prepared to
answer?20
This adolescent will need advice, but her masculine relations will have
to stand mute, powerless to help her. Her needs, often referred to but
never specified, are mysterious feminine ones that only another female
can comprehend and address. The father, stated the judge, simply "cannot
function . . . as a mother to a growing daughter."2' The judge was
convinced that Tara, in "her advance as a woman," must have the
"mature female presence" of her mother.? This underlying theme in the
opinion reflects strongly felt assumptions about the roles mothers and
fathers play in the lives and development of their children. Many people,
experts included, have long relegated fathers to a minor familial role in
child development.2? Margaret Mead once referred to fathers as a
"biological necessity but a social accident."24 Recent psychological
research, however, is beginning to demonstrate quite clearly that fathers
contribute significantly to the social, sexual, intellectual, and emotional
development of their children.2 Professor Reed Adams, in a review of the
literature on father/daughter custody, observed that the "father/daughter
relationship has been assumed by some to be of less importance than has
actually been the case. Although many persons have assumed that
children's ties to their parents are based on the sex of the parent, recent
studies have not supported such a position."2 6 He concluded that social
science research does not support the assumption that mothers are best
suited for and should always be given custody of their daughters, and that
this assumption can do more harm than good. In his view, in determining
custody, the decision makers must consider the "total psychological and
social condition" existing within the family framework?
20. Id. at 23, col. 6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 24, col. 1.
23. See Levy, supra note 15, at 102-04.
24. Id. at 105 (quoting M. Mead).
25. Id. at 106-07.
26. Adams, FatherlDaughter Custody: A Growing Social and Judicial Dilemma, TRLA4
Sept. 1981, at 52.
27. Id. at 54.
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The image of the incompetent father is firmly entrenched within our
culture. Professor Dennis Orthner and his colleagues interviewed twenty-
four single parent fathers.2 Contrary to the cultural stereotype, the
interviews revealed fathers who felt confident in their primary parenting
abilities and derived a great deal of satisfaction from the experiences of
fatherhood.29 Ironically, even these authors expected fathers to be poor at
the job:
We had anticipated a significant problem with role strain and
adjustment to being the primary parent but we found little evidence
that this is a major handicap. All of the fathers experienced some
problems but these were not unlike the difficulties experienced in
most families. The sense of pride in being able to cope with the
challenge of parenthood and seeing their children mature under their
guidance is a major compensating force.3
They reported that two fathers with daughters going through puberty
expressed considerable dismay about having to give them the
"proper" sex education. This should not be taken to mean that
these fathers felt less competent in rearing daughters. Many
mothers, in fact, share the same concerns. The fathers in question
considered problems such as this to be situational, not continual
and, overall, they felt they were quite successful in rearing their
daughters. 31
The judge's assumption that fathers cannot help their daughters
through the shoals of puberty suggests another, subtler danger judges face
in custody decision making. It is possible, perhaps inevitable, that anyone
contemplating the family situation of another is psychologically tempted
to imagine himself or herself in the position of the family member with
whom he or she most closely identifies. A male judge in his sixties, for
example, might (consciously or not) place himself in the role of father to
a pre-teen daughter and wonder: How would I cope with her questions
28. Orther, Brown & Ferguson, Single Parent Fatherhood. An Emerging Family Life
Style, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 429, 436 (1976) [hereinafter Single Parent Fatherhood].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 433. This study is small and relies upon the self-reports of fathers. Yet, it
clearly suggests caution in indulging in stereotypical thinking about the inability of men to
act as parents. The study does not imply, of course, that the mother's role is less important.
Rather, it is likely that each parent has a unique and valuable role to play. For a case that
recognizes the importance of fathers as well as mothers in the development of daughters,
see Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
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about sex, menstruation, and similar matters? The judge's discomfort with
these topics (a feeling probably common among men, particularly older
men) might easily lead to the conclusion that no man could deal with
these things. The greater the personal feeling of discomfort, the stronger
the conviction that this issue ought to weigh heavily against, if not
disqualify, the male litigant in the case.32
I do not suggest that judges should try to eliminate such thoughts
from their minds. All they would succeed in doing is driving these
thoughts out of consciousness, into the unconscious realm where they
would retain their power but remain unexamined. There is a role for
personal reactions, thoughts, and feelings in the deciding of cases, but it
is a role that must be carefully defined and monitored. A legitimate part
of the art of judging is a sympathetic attempt to understand the
participants and to get "the feel" of the case.33 A judge inevitably draws
upon his own reactions and emotional responses to help assess the
demeanor of the witnesses, the truth of what they say, and the underlying
motivations of the parties.
Child custody cases generate more substantial and complex emotions
which may run deeper than those inspired by other litigation. One judge
observed of these cases: "Every current of our lives runs through them.
They engage our most deeply held beliefs, recall our most poignant
experiences." 34 Innumerable beliefs -about the reliability and quality of
mothers and fathers, the appropriate roles of family members, the nature
of the bonds that exist between mothers and sons, mothers and daughters,
fathers and sons, and fathers and daughters, to name a few-may play a
role in determining how a judge reacts to the family before him.
Resemblances to the judge's own family may have profound effects on his
perceptions of this family. A judge may read his own family insecurities
and anxieties into the character of the family before him in court. The
judge may have particularly strong reactions to any family member who
violates the judge's own deeply ingrained family values and norms.
In the face of these possible influences, a judge must carefully
consider his own reactions to the people appearing before him. Has the
judge accurately comprehended the reality of family life of these
individuals, or are his own beliefs, recalled experiences, values, and
emotions recasting that reality into a version of family life more familiar
to the judge? Put another way, the judge's conclusions about these
32. Experts as well as judges need to guard against personal emotional responses that
compromise fair evaluation 6f the family in court. See R. GARDNER, FAMILY EVALUATON
IN CH LD CUSTODY MEIAMON, AsrrRAION, AND LmrGAON 47 (1989).
33. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. Cui. L. REv. 835, 851-60 (1987) (discussing the
nature of judgment).
34. In re Custody of Temos, 304 Pa. Super. 82, 95, 450 A.2d 111, 117 (1982).
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individuals may be a function of the judge's own experiences of family
life, rather than a realistic appraisal of a different family's life.
The judge's own family experience can intrude into cases in different
ways. First, cases are by their nature incomplete. In a custody case, for
example, a judge will never have all the evidence about the father's
personality, motivations, past history, and parental capacities. Nor will he
have all the evidence about the mother, all possible evidence about the
children, and all the details of their interrelationships and family life.
When information is fragmentary, there is room for the decision maker
to "fill in the blanks" with assumptions and inferences about matters not
directly in evidence. The more incomplete the picture presented by the
evidence, the more the judge's own mind must imagine and fill in the
undrawn portion.35
Even when evidence is presented there is room for the injection of
personal values, beliefs, and experiences. A judge must decide what
significance to attach to what he hears. What if the evidence shows, as it
did in the Green case, that the custodial parent did not serve the child
breakfast in the morning? To a judge with memories of mother lovingly
preparing breakfast for the family, the absence of any family breakfast
routine may signify a serious parental lapse. A judge with her own
children and a working husband may attach no importance to the absence
of family breakfasts labored over by a mother or father.
Avoiding the distorting effects of one's own life and beliefs on the
faculties of perception and judgment is no easy task. This may be
particularly true for trial judges, who exercise their power in relative
isolation. For appellate judges, who act in groups, the process of
discussion and exchange of views before decision may help to identify and
limit the intrusion of idiosyncratic beliefs and values. The trial judge,
under great pressure to make decisions promptly and with little
opportunity to talk things out before deciding, seems peculiarly vulnerable
to the influence of unconscious assumptions and biases produced by his
own unique life experiences.
What can a judge do? If thoughts generated about the parties and
their case can be articulated, judges can give themselves the opportunity
to subject these thoughts to further scrutiny. This would seem to be
particularly important when a judge's thoughts generate strong feelings
about a central issue in the case. For example, the thought that "fathers
are not likely to be able to handle adolescent teenage girls" can be
articulated, and then recognized as being founded upon further ideas
about the special needs of maturing girls, the overriding importance of a
35. This phenomenon, known as "filling," is described (in the context of lawyer-client
interviewing) in D. BINDER & S. PnicE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-
CENTERED APPROACH 45.46 (1977).
[Vol. 34
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parent's ability to deal with puberty-related issues, and the common
deficiencies of fathers in this area. Many of these ideas, in turn, can be
posed as questions and explored in the adversarial presentations of the
parties. If the lawyers are advised that these questions represent matters
of great concern to the judge, they can bring in pertinent evidence from
experts and information from the psychological literature bearing on these
issues.s6 Where necessary, judges can solicit further information on their
own initiative, to ensure that they have more than their own intuitions
and personal proclivities to draw upon. If the judge does not rely too
heavily on the rightness of his own assumptions, this procedure might
help limit the negative effects of personal biasY
In the Green case, it is worthwhile to ask whether the judge, perhaps
influenced by personal beliefs about family life, overrated the mother's
parenting capacity and underrated the father's. The mother in the case
had not had custody of her three children for four years, since her
divorce. We are never told, and cannot be sure the judge ever was
informed, why this mother did not originally gain custody of her children.
Did she lack interest, motivation, or parenting skills? Was there some
temporary problem or situational factor which changed in the ensuing
four years? A court should know the answers to these questions before
it seriously entertains a request for a shift in custodial arrangements. It
does not appear from the opinion, however, that the judge pursued these
matters.ss In fact, the judge disclosed that he ignored past county
probation department reports on this family. He wrote that
prior studies made by the [d]epartment . . . have not been
considered since there was no agreement by the parties that the
court could do so. Obviously, the parties who prepared the
reports were available to be called if there was anything in those
reports bearing upon the issues before this court.39
Thus, the judge did not insist on seeing evidence concerning the
36. For an excellent discussion of the problems a custody judge faces in dealing with
the psychological literature, and a suggestion that judges articulate and seek out evidence
about assumed but disputable facts about children, see Davis, 'There Is a Book Out...
An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. RaV. 1539 (1987).
37. For two provocative and helpful discussions of the way that judges' assumptions
are often thought of and presented in opinions as "ordinary common sense," see Sherwin,
Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 729, 737-39, 755, 829-30 (1988); Perlin, Psychodyamics and the Insaniy Defense:
"Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 67 Nm. L Rnv. (1990)
(forthcoming).
38. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
39. Green, N.Y.L., July 14, 1988, at 23, col. 5.
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original award of residential custody of the daughter and full custody of
the two sons to the father.
As a general principle, trusting lawyers to present all relevant
evidence may work well in ordinary civil cases. Custody cases, however,
present special concerns. The most important interest at stake is not the
litigants', but the unrepresented child's. It is possible that each lawyer may
wish to keep a certain document from the court, based upon a judgment
about the balance of positive and negative facts about his or her client in
the document. For different reasons, both parties may choose not to
present a piece of evidence to the judge. In custody modification cases,
there may be pertinent information in prior evaluation reports. 0 It is
incumbent on the judge to at least look at them, whether or not counsel
for one parent or the other presents them, to insure that all evidence
relevant to the child's interests is considered.
As for the father, the judge indicated that he was successful as a
single parent. Indeed, the judge noted that Tara was an unusually mature
and articulate eleven year old. But the judge's brief acknowledgement that
"the father has done reasonably well to bring Tara to this point"41 seems
to understate the father's parenting capacities. This father, like other
fathers with custody, may have developed parental concerns, interests, and
skills that he did not have before. Out of necessity, fathers may learn
more about child care than they ever dreamed they would. Orthner,
Brown, and Ferguson, in their study of single parent fathers, noted that
fathers became
much more appreciative of the responsibilities of being the primary
parent.
One case was particularly striking. A father of a preschool child
was the president of a small textile firm. He had never been very
concerned about the child care responsibilities of his female
employees; he took it for granted that plenty of facilities were
available. But when he became a single parent, he too faced the
plight of finding adequate day care. Now he is thinking in terms of
operating a professionally run day care center at his plant as a
40. This depends, of course, on the contents of the report and whether subsequent
events have affected its validity. Some things, like personality defects or poor
communication patterns, are not likely to change, and should certainly be known to the
court.
In considering a judge's failure to insist upon all pertinent evidence in a case, Judge
Joseph Colquitt makes the interesting observation that "a trial judge's attitude toward social
facts may influence an attorney's decision to present or refrain from presenting certain types
of evidence to that judge." Colquitt, Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at Trial, 30
ARz. L REv. 51, 59 (1988).
41. Green, N.Y.L.J. at 24, col. 1.
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benefit for his employees. 42
Did the father in Green improve his parenting skills over the past
four years when he had residential custody of three children? The judge
devoted little attention to the father's parenting skills, although this
should be an important part of any custody determination. All we are told
is that meals were inadequately prepared in his house ("meals are
sporadic and meager, consisting mostly of nothing (breakfast) or "junk"
food for lunch and dinner. Occasionally there may be a regular meal, but
Tara's indications are that they are few and far between.")." Of course,
Tara could make her own breakfasts and the father could easily show that
preparing meals is difficult for any single parent. If there is a problem
with general inattention by the father to many of Tara's needs, the judge
did not demonstrate this. The judge may have carefully canvassed the
father's assets and liabilities as a parent, but it is not evident from his
opinion. Indeed, with respect to the parenting capacities of both mother
and father in this case, it must be concluded that the judge's opinion has
failed to adequately address the issues that are vital to any custody
decision.
We can only speculate as to the judge's inner thoughts in this case.
But it is fair to ask whether his preoccupation with the unarticulated
needs of a teenage girl advancing into womanhood reflects the judge's
own personal beliefs and anxieties about the situation, rather than his
clear-minded analysis of the best interests of the child. It may well be that
the judge made the right decision in this case, and that the child in
question will flourish following the change in custody. But without more
information about the parents and their parenting abilities, and about the
child and her interactions with each parent, it is impossible to feel any
firm degree of confidence in this decision. There is much more we need
to know about this family before we can agree that the judge has made
the best decision for Tara.
III. L.H. v. RH.44: THE CASE OF THE "REMOTE CONTROL" MOTHER
In L.H. v. RH., the same judge determined custody of twin daughters,
aged seven. The parents were married for thirteen years. Mrs. H. worked
part time as an investigator for a law firm and did weekend work as a
registered nurse. Her husband, a successful pediatrician, provided the
principal financial support for the family. When the children were born,
42. Single Parent Fatherhood, supra note 28, at 433.
43. Green, N.Y.L.J. at 23, col. 6.
44. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 6, 1989, at 26, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 1989). The vivid phrase "re-
mote control mother" is Judge Winick's.
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Mrs. H. stopped working, but returned to work within a year.
Over the course of the marriage, it appears that the mother in this
family had virtually opted out of motherhood. She structured her daily
activities in a way that left her with remarkably little contact with her
children. "At 6:30 or 7:00 in the morning," the judge wrote, "she is off to
the gym, then to work. She doesn't see the children until after their
dinner and then sometimes not until late at night. '45 The father saw to
it that the children got up, were fed, and went off to school. Much of the
mother's time was taken up with seeing her lover, a fact which the judge
noted not for purposes of condemning her sexual activity, but to further
stress the tendency of the mother to put her own needs ahead of her
children's. "[A]bsenting herself from her children at a time when they
are in great stress from the impending breakup of the marriage" is
evidence, the judge wrote, of her "misplaced priorities." After hearing
her testimony, the judge was persuaded that she really did not want
responsibility for the daily care of the children. Instead, it appeared that
she staged the custody fight in order to defeat her husband in his genuine
desire to have custody. In this light, Mrs. H.'s new-found motherly
interests, including a stint as a "Brownie" leader, did not impress the
court as a sincere effort but as a transparent litigation tactic. 47
Early in his opinion, Judge Winick established his principal theme:
parenthood involves a degree of sacrifice and selflessness not
demonstrated by the mother in the case. The mother here, he declared,
"though she can hardly be described as an abusive parent ... is more
motivated by her own interests than those of her children .... She loves
her children, no doubt, but is not prepared to recognize her continuing
obligations in terms of the children's needs."
The father, by contrast, is described as a selfless parent, one who
recognizes the obligations and responsibilities that being a good parent
entails:
Mhe court finds the father to be just the kind of selfless parent
that the mother is not. It is he who bore the major share in the
upbringing of these children. It is he who provided the guidance
and care and comfort so needed, especially to fill the void left by
the mother. It is he who understands that being a parent bears
some sacrifice.49
45. LH., N.Y.LJ. at 26, col. 6.
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The judge supported these conclusions with compelling details culled
from the extensive testimony in the case. In addition to the testimony of
the parties, the court also had the benefit of hearing from three mental-
health experts. One witness, Dr. Linda Sandler, called by the father, was
a psychotherapist who had previously seen both the mother and the father
in therapy. Dr. Sandier testified to the mother's admitted difficulty in
coping with her children, her stated need to have relationships with men
other than her husband, and her desire to be on her own.50 The therapist
noted that the mother exhibited depression, compulsive behavior, and
emotional disturbance which made her the less preferred custodial parent,
particularly in light of the parental skill of the father.5' The father, in
fact, had assumed the nurturing role in the family without much support
from his wife and had managed very well. Since he was clearly the more
nurturing, involved, and capable parent, Dr. Sandier felt he should be
awarded custody.
Oddly enough, the forensic report of the county probation and mental
health services departments recommended that the mother gain custody.
52
The report claimed that the mother would be more available to the
children than the father and that she was the more nurturing parent. The
judge identified three convincing reasons to reject these conclusions. First,
the forensic report was based upon an expert's one-hour interview with
each parent.53 Such brief interviews hardly afforded the time needed to
develop a true understanding of the family's dynamics and actual
functioning. Second, other persons who had important information were
heard in court, but were not interviewed by the forensic examiners. 4
Third, the report was premised upon the truth of the statements made to
the department's expert by the mother.55 In court, the mother revealed
herself to be an unreliable witness; her accounts of her own availability
(both physically and emotionally) were unworthy of belief.
Despite the judge's rejection of the county's recommendation, his
opinion treated the county's expert, Dr. Sundstrom, rather gingerly.
Indeed, the judge appeared to be making a determined effort to find
something to praise in her poorly-handled evaluation report. Saying he
"respectfully disagree[d]" with her recommendation, the judge added that
he "recognize[d] and value[d] the expertise of Dr. Sundstrom," calling her
agency's report "an important tool in aiding the court" to reach its
50. Id. at 27, col. 2.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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(contrary) determination.56 Fault is diverted from Dr. Sundstrom by the
judge's observation that the expert was "misled in her factual findings by
what the mother has told her, or... what the mother has not told her. '57
This, of course, will not do. Any mental-health expert must be aware
that a parent being interviewed for a custody evaluation has every reason
to make self-serving statements and to otherwise omit, color, and distort
the facts. Dr. Sundstrom's attempt to decide from her brief parent
interviews where the truth lay was doomed to fail. As psychiatrist Alan
M. Levy has written,
it is tempting to see if you [the evaluator] can determine who is
telling the "truth" and who is not. This can prove to be a
fruitless and time consuming mission and is best left to the
courts. The evaluator is urged rather to rely on his/her clinical
skills which emphasize interviewing and observation of parents
and children.58
A mental-health professional who allows herself to be "taken in" by
a self-interested litigant has poorly served the court and more importantly,
poorly served the interests of the children whose future lives and well
being are at stake.
In contrast to the judge's kid-glove handling of Dr. Sundstrom was his
somewhat dismissive attitude toward the father's expert, Dr. Harold S.
Koplewicz. The judge first stressed that there was a "flaw" in Dr.
Koplewicz's evaluaion, stemming from the fact that Mrs. H. declined to
appear for an interview with him.59 "[I]t is in the court's discretion," thejudge declared, "to afford little weight to Dr. Koplewicz's opinion, in
light of the fact that the recommendations were made without the benefit
of an interview with the mother."6 Of course it is true that this expert,
not having seen both parents, cannot (and did not attempt to) make a
recommendation as to which parent would be the better custodian. But
if he has done a careful and thorough evaluation of the father and
children, he might potentially contribute important information about the
father's parenting abilities and the father's relationships with the children.
Furthermore, since no other expert saw the children, if Dr. Koplewicz did
so, he could offer unique information about them.
Unfortunately, the judge's opinion merely recites Dr. Koplewicz's
56. Id. at 27, col. 2.
57. Id.
58. Levy, Major Pifalls in Child Custody Evaluation, 2 FAIR OAKS HosP. PSYCH. Lermr
1, 3 (1984).
59. L.H., N.Y.U. at 27, col. 2.
60. Id.
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conclusion that the father would be a good custodial parent, without
indicating either the psychiatrist's evaluative techniques or the specific
observations, tests, or interview data that support his conclusion. The
judge wrote of the effect of Dr. Koplewicz' testimony:
The court has given some weight to his findings to this
extent, that the father is a fit custodial parent. But it should be
quickly said that the court has not grounded its decision in that
finding, but in its review of all the credible evidence of the
parties and the other experts in the case. It has not arbitrarily
accepted Dr. Koplewicz's findings nor arbitrarily rejected these
findings.61
Thus ends the consideration of Dr. Koplewicz's testimony. It
ambiguously resides in the twilight zone somewhere between arbitrary
rejection and arbitrary acceptance. This is a strange fate for such a well
versed expert as Dr. Koplewicz, who served as the director-in-chief of
child and adolescent psychiatry at the Long Island Jewish Medical Center,
trained child psychiatrists, supervised clinical services for childen and
adolescents, and taught at Columbia University's medical school.62 It is
possible that the judge simply did not think much of Dr. Koplewicz's
evaluation in this particular case. But it is also possible that the judge's
concerns, having nothing to do with the quality of the doctor's testimony,
contributed to the apparent devaluation of it in the judge's written
opinion. In particular, the haste with which the judge assures us that he
has "not grounded his decision" on the doctor's findings, together with his
disclaimer of arbitrariness, suggests anxiety on the judge's part that the
case not be seen as having been unduly influenced by this expert's
testimony.6 Since the doctor did not see the mother, deciding custody on
the basis of his evidence might provide grounds for reversal should the
case be appealed. We may reasonably expect judges, like other human
beings, to be concerned about how their work appears to others,
particularly others who are higher in the hierarchy in which they operate.
Pride and professional reputation are involved. So is the understandable
desire not to have to re-try a custody case that the judge believes has
already been properly decided. I suspect that opinions are often crafted
in such a way as to reduce the chances of appellate reversal,64 with judges
61. Id.
62. The credentials of Dr. Koplewicz are set forth in trial testimony he furnished in
In re Baby M., published in 5 BABY M. CAsE: Tna COMPLam TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS 120-23
(S. Robbins ed. 1988).
63. LH., N.Y.L.J. at 27, col. 2.
64. Dr. Andrew Watson agrees that the "inevitable narcissistic desire not to be
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denying or de-emphasizing the true importance of matters that they feel,
rightly or wrongly, will imperil the decision on appeal. By so doing,
however, judges obscure the true bases of their decisions and sacrifice the
judicial virtues of clarity, candor, and openness in the opinion-writing
process.
Institutional and personal concerns may also explain the special
attention Judge Winick paid to Dr. Sundstrom's problematic report.
Judges and county probation and mental health departments have a
necessary, ongoing relationship with one another. Both sides need each
other to do their jobs. County officials preparing court-ordered
evaluations perform an important function for judges, and judges, in turn,
probably feel the need to preserve good working relationships. Hence
criticism, even if justified, needs to be muted. The danger lies in the
promotion of these working interests to the point where they undermine
the basic mission of the system in which the various professionals operate.
If the performance of one of the participants is not up to standard, it is
vital that someone in the system point out the problem and insist on a
higher quality of work in the future.
In this light, Judge Winick commendably did not avoid the issue of
the forensic examiner's shortcomings. His message in rejecting the county
department's report was delicately couched and perhaps a shade too
indulgent, given the serious nature of the flaws that marred the report.
But it was still a clear enough "veto message," one which caught the
attention of the newspaper reporter (a story about the case made the
front page of the daily law journal under the headline, "Court Ignores
Recommendation in Custody Award")5 and undoubtedly made an
impression on the individuals involved. Whether the case will have a
salutary effect in the future depends on many factors, including the ability
of the individuals to accept criticism and to alter conduct, and perhaps
just as important, the willingness of the county to allocate adequate
resources to these departments, so that social service personnel are not
under unremitting pressure to do too much work in too little time. An
administrative structure that overvalues the productivity and efficiency of
its staff risks sacrificing the less measurable values of accuracy and
quality. When this happens in forensic evaluations, it is the children,
above all, who suffer.
A final feature of this case is worthy of note. Despite the wealth of
mental-health expertise brought to bear upon this case, the court's
opinion makes no mention of any interview with the children, save one -
reversed will influence greatly the judge's writing process." Watson, Some Psychological
Aspects of the Tial Judge's Decision Making, 39 MERcER L. Ray. 937, 949 (1988).
65. Kohn, Court Ignores Recommendation in Custody Award, N.Y.Ll., Oct. 6, 1989, at
1, col. 5.
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the judge's own. Information about this interview is prefaced by the
judge's comment that he "has not placed great reliance on what these
seven-year-old girls have said." Nevertheless, he wrote that "it is obvious
to the court that these children are very comfortable with the father,
depend upon him for their nurturing, and that he is the primary actor in
their lives. On the other hand, they are somewhat uncomfortable with
things the mother does."'' These are important matters which the judge
claims he has gleaned from his personal interview with the children.
Although in this case what the judge learned was merely corroborative of
the great weight of the testimony, in another case where the testimony
was more evenly balanced, the statements of the children might have been
of considerable influence. Judicial interviewing of children has inherent
drawbacks, including the lack of time to develop the rapport necessary to
draw the children out, and the difficulty in detecting the sorts of parental
influences and psychic needs that may affect and distort their testimony.
Mental-heath professionals have an advantage in interviewing children-
assuming they devote enough time to the task-because of their training
in identifying psychological forces influencing the child and their
experience in obtaining information from children through a variety of
interviewing techniques.67 While it is understandable for a judge not to
credit the custody preferences of seven-year-old girls, it is apparent that
even young children may have important information concerning the
custody decision. Judges, inexpert as they may be in the delicate art of
interviewing children, must be cautious about placing too much
confidence in their own ability to elicit significant, accurate information
from in camera interviews with children.68
IV. CONCLUSION
Judges come to all cases with a complex set of beliefs, values, and life
experiences. Custody cases, with their often evocative tableaus of family
life, generate thoughts and emotional responses that may trace back to
the judge's own experiences of and beliefs about family life. Sometimes
a judge may identify with a particular family member, place himself in the
situation presented by the family before him, and act upon the anxieties,
fears, or insecurities that the situation inspires.
Judges need to deal with the personal and emotional responses these
66. Id. at 27, col. 3.
67. R. GARDNER, supra note 31, at 253-306.
68. Id. at 467-89; Jones, Judicial Questioning of Children in Custody and Visitation
Proceedings, 18 FAm. L.Q. 43, 67-91 (1984) (comprehensive discussion of problems and
benefits of questioning by a judge, with recommendations based upon child development
principles).
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cases generate by identifying and articulating the specific thoughts they
have about the parties and their family situation. When a judge reacts
strongly to persons or events in a case, the reaction may be entirely
appropriate (as in the case of the inattentive, "remote control" mother)
or it may be an indication that the case is stimulating intensely felt but
idiosyncratic thoughts and beliefs, ones which may cloud the judge's
perceptions and judgments about the family in court. Where evidence is
incomplete (true in all cases to varying degrees), a judge must be clear
minded enough to make the appropriate inferences and draw the proper
conclusions from the facts given. If unanalyzed thoughts and emotions
interfere, his or her judgment will be unreliable.
The institutional structure of the law may also subtly influence the
custody judge. The trial court's solitariness in decision making inhibits
voicing and testing emotional responses, and precludes getting feedback
from co-equal decision makers. The spectre of appellate review can direct
opinion writing into legally acceptable channels without guaranteeing a
candid exposition of the evidence relied upon or the values and
assumptions underlying the decision. Dependence upon court affiliated
mental-health experts may lead judges to "go along" too readily with the
experts' recommendations (making Judge Winick's rejection of a
probation department report newsworthy). Lack of judicial training in
child interviewing techniques may occasionally render the hallowed in
camera interview a useless, or worse, misleading source of support for a
court's conclusions.
Correctives for the distorting effects of these psychological and
institutional influences are not easy to find. Certainly these matters can
not simply be "put out of mind." At least, their identification and
articulation, as early as possible in the litigation process, will allow for
conscious reflection and perhaps evidentiary exploration. Courts must
commit themselves to the fullest production of evidence about the central
questions surrounding the custody determination. If the judge is well
informed about the parties' assets and liabilities as parents, their actual
levels of child involvement and attachment, and the quality of their
parent-child relationships and communication patterns, the force of the
evidence may predominate over otherwise powerful extraneous factors.
Should the judge succeed in all this, of course, the formidable task of
deciding the fate of children with wisdom, sensitivity, and care still
remains. But it is a duty that can be discharged with greater fairness and
truer justice.
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